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New priorities for climate science
and climate economics in the 2020s
David A. Stainforth 1,2,3✉ & Raphael Calel1,4
Climate science and climate economics are critical sources of expertise in our
pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals. Effective use of this expertise
requires a strengthening of its epistemic foundations and a renewed focus on
more practical policy problems.
The seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) represent the United Nation’s aspirations
for global development. Athough only one of them, goal 13, relates specifically to climate change,
the strong synergies between climate and health, food, water, energy and social systems, mean
that climate change will affect our progress towards almost every one1. Climate science and
climate economics can help us navigate a route towards these goals, but the approaches that
currently dominate in these disciplines limit their ability to contribute effectively and to provide
the best possible guidance. The next decade needs to see a massive scale-up of research effort but
not one invested in doing more of the same. Radical changes are needed. Breakthroughs will
initially come not by focusing on the potential of exascale computing2, which provides a billion
billion calculations per second and thereby facilitates higher resolution climate models, but
rather from investing in integrated multi-disciplinary expertise. Two issues must be addressed.
First is a better understanding and characterisation of the fundamental conceptual challenges in
making climate projections. Second is the integration of multi-disciplinary knowledge and
perspectives to provide the most robust information currently possible on specific questions of
practical relevance to decision-makers and society. To support the SDGs the next decade
requires investment in skills and expertise which bring together subjects as diverse as, for
instance, stochastic and physical processes, philosophy of science, economics and water man-
agement. Computing and data remain essential but must play supporting roles rather than the
lead positions they have ascended to over recent decades.
Observed and expected global warming stands on solid epistemic foundations, as does the
expectation of increasingly severe impacts on, for instance, ecosystems, food systems, and water
availability3. The existence of the threat is not in question2 and is accepted by the vast majority of
scientists4. Consequently climate change science now concerns itself substantially with the details
of the expected changes, such as how warming will be distributed regionally5, local changes in
precipitation, heatwaves, and wildfires6, and probability distributions for parameters such as
climate sensitivity7. The question for climate science going forward, one might say, is how to
increase the spatial and probabilistic resolution of its forecasts.
One response has been to call for international collaboration and investment in exascale
computing for climate modelling2; similar to CERN’s provision of particle acceleration in par-
ticle physics8. Currently Global Climate Model (GCM) outputs are critical for economic plan-
ning in relation to the SDGs because they are widely interpreted as a source of information
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regarding how different regions will experience different climatic
changes; information which if reliable would be valuable in
designing sustainable responses. However, questions about the
reliability of GCM outputs for this purpose have been raised over
a number of years2,9–11. Most recently Palmer and Stevens2 have
discussed the inadequacies of current models in terms of the scale
of global and regional biases which are often greater than the
signals they aim to simulate. The presumption that these inade-
quacies can be remedied with better computers is best under-
stood within a paradigm that assumes that the existence of
reliable multi-decadal predictive models is currently prevented
primarily by limited computational capacity. This assumption,
however, is one which is rarely stated and even less often
defended. Probabilistic predictions of low dimensional nonlinear
systems can show high sensitivity to model formulation12 known
as the hawkmoth effect, akin to the butterfly effect but related to
model structure rather than initial values. Climate models may or
may not show high sensitivity to the finest details of model
structure but regional responses can certainly change sub-
stantially as model parameters are varied9. How close to reality
then do climate models need to be to generate robust, reliable
predictions of the spatial and probabilistic details of future cli-
mate change? How big a computer, how complex a model, and
how high a resolution is necessary? Given that both the butterfly
effect and the hawkmoth effect may affect the results, how big an
ensemble do we need and how should it be designed? These
fundamental questions have yet to be addressed.
The fact is that we do not know what the binding constraints
are to achieving the desired predictive capability. Before
ploughing billions into developing specialised computers and
associated computer models2, it would be wise to first develop a
good theoretical understanding of what is necessary and suffi-
cient to build models capable of such high-resolution predictions.
Without such understanding, model-based predictions are
likely to be over-quantified and over-constrained, under-
estimating the true uncertainty. This introduces two significant
risks. First is the risk that such predictions encourage policy
makers trying to make progress towards the SDGs to lock in
inappropriate long-term investments; for instance when new
flood protection infrastructure turns out to be either unnecessary
or insufficient. Second is the risk of undermining the credibility
of the larger research enterprise. If overly constrained projections
turn out to be wrong, or simply replaced by very different pro-
jections from the next generation of models, it might encourage
scepticism over the reliability of climate science more broadly.
One response to these concerns is to acknowledge that because
our uncertainty estimates are often founded on a limited set of
models and observations we should not expect well-quantified
probability distributions but rather seek less precise domains of
possible outcomes9. Research aimed at exploring such domains
using perturbed-physics ensembles could prioritise the wide
exploration of uncertainty9. Such an approach arguably provides
better information for use in planning sustainable responses and
supporting activities to achieve the SDGs because it is less sus-
ceptible to the underestimation of uncertainty. Indeed in the
short term it may very well lead to increasing estimates of
uncertainty as wider ranges of model parameters are explored
and a proliferation of equally credible model formulations are
found. This would nevertheless represent valuable progress as it
would present a more robust evaluation of what may be in store.
Fixating too much on reducing estimates of uncertainty can
undermine efforts to achieve more robust information.
Climate change economics has long been characterised by a
parallel “race-for-resolution”. Climate economics has its origins
in the project of constructing integrated assessment models to
produce cost-benefit analyses of mitigation policies, and sub-
sequent generations of these models provide more regional and
sectoral disaggregation13–15. Weitzman16, however, has pointed
out that under some mild epistemic constraints which would give
rise to a fat-tailed probability distribution for the equili-
brium climate sensitivity, the benefits of mitigation do not con-
verge under the standard assumptions of cost-benefit analysis.
Climate economists it seemed had spent decades attempting to
provide ever-better numerical estimates of a benefit-cost ratio
that could well be infinite. Even if the equilibrium climate sen-
sitivity isn’t strictly fat-tailed, the benefit-cost ratio appears to be
highly sensitive to the shape of the probability distributions for
physical parameters which suffer from deep uncertainty17.
Similarly now, an effort is underway to leverage vast amounts of
historical weather and economic data to derive more precise and
more disaggregated mappings between climatic conditions and
economic damages18, but it appears that these types of inferences
rest on some rather strong and implausible assumptions19. It
would perhaps be wise to put a greater emphasis on trying to
understand the fundamental limitations on these projects from
the beginning. For instance, to what extent are historical data
likely to contain information regarding long-term future damages
resulting from climate change? Similarly, when uncertainty in
one element of the problem overwhelms all other aspects is there
a risk that complicated analysis could obscure rather than illu-
minate the main message? If our quantitative answers hinge on
assumptions that are not well founded (e.g. the shape of the
climate sensitivity distribution) then perhaps we should seek a
better way of posing the questions.
One approach receiving increasing attention in the physical
sciences is the plausible storyline concept20. This aims to provide
detailed regional or local information about future changes in
climate, conditioned on a set of plausible, clearly-presented
assumptions but with no attempt to assess relative probabilities.
By foregrounding the assumptions the approach has the flex-
ibility to capture a wider range of possible futures and facilitate
debate over their relevance. It has been discussed in general terms
in a number of articles10,20,21 and applied in several specific
cases22–24. It has substantial potential to support the SDGs by
exploring interconnected physical and social storylines25, con-
strained by physical and social science understanding. Computer
models may provide details20,23–25 but model simulations are
ideally constructed to inform the storyline rather than being its
foundation. In one example physical storylines were generated
regarding the variety of ways in which the Indian summer
monsoon might respond to climate change22, with these changes
then linked to a variety of options for responding to water
demand in southern India supported by simulations with a water
resources model25.
There would also be significant value in adopting more multi-
disciplinary and expertise-centred approaches. Anthropogenic
climate change is taking the Earth along a never before experi-
enced trajectory, towards a never before experienced state.
Because empirical validation of our models is necessarily carried
out within a different, probably very different, state of the system,
confidence in statements about the future can only come from an
understanding of the underlying processes at work; an under-
standing that goes beyond our models. We need to develop
understanding of the fundamental dependencies and uncertain-
ties inherent when trying to project the future under climate
change. Much could be learned from simpler systems to help us
develop the most informative experimental designs26. We should
draw upon expertise from a range of disciplines to build an
integrated picture that reflects our best understanding of the
geographical, sectoral, physical, and temporal aspects of the
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climate change problem. Climate science research needs to be
more guided by the questions addressed in the social sciences and
economics while climate economics needs to be more aware of
the sources of deep uncertainty in the response of the physical
system. In the next decade we need to see an integration of
expertise from a range of mathematical, physical, and social
science disciplines in order to generate robust actionable infor-
mation to help us plan for the future. Confidence arises from a
foundation of expertise; data and models are essential tools, but
neither they nor their outputs are the end goal.
How, then, do we achieve the rich possibilities of science and
economics to support individual, national and international
aspirations such as those represented by the SDGs? A major
international effort is certainly needed but it must come with a
change of focus. We need experts with understanding which
spans physics and economics. Climate science and economics
should obviously continue to search for answers to societally
pressing questions, but they must be more sensitive to
the epistemic constraints they face as a result of the
limited conceptual foundations for extrapolatory projections.
There is indeed a need to invest in a CERN-like research
enterprise, but its goal should be to build integrated expertise,
not just models.
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